The “Matthew Effect” and market concentration: search complementarities and monopsony power by Fernandez-Villaverde, J. et al.
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Fernandez-Villaverde, J. and Mandelman, F. and Yu, Y. and Zanetti, F. (2021)
The “Matthew Effect” and market concentration: search complementarities




Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.










The “Matthew Effect” and Market 
Concentration: Search 





University of Pennsylvania 
 
Federico Mandelman 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
 
Yang Yu 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics 
 
Francesco Zanetti 








































The “Matthew Effect” and Market Concentration:




Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Yang Yu





This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms that face
search complementarities in the formation of vendor contracts. Search complementarities
amplify small differences in productivity among firms. Market concentration fosters
monopsony power in the labor market, magnifying profits and further enhancing high-
productivity firms’ output share. Firms want to get bigger and hire more workers, in
stark contrast with the classic monopsony model, where a firm aims to reduce the amount
of labor it hires. The combination of search complementarities and monopsony power
induces a strong “Matthew effect” that endogenously generates superstar firms out of
uniform idiosyncratic productivity distributions. Reductions in search costs increase market
concentration, lower the labor income share, and increase wage inequality.
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Merton (1968) famously identified the “Matthew effect”: For whoever has will be given more,
and they will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken
from them. Merton’s insight was straightforward: small exogenous differences get amplified,
often by orders of magnitude, by the endogenous responses of agents to those small differences.
In Merton’s original example, small differences in scientific productivity are magnified by the
extreme inequality in the allocation of limited resources (grant money, graduate students, journal
pages). Imagine a national research agency that only has enough money to finance one research
lab, but can correctly identify ex-ante differences in scientific productivity among professors.
Even if professor A is just 1% more productive than professor B, professor A will get the funds
to run a lab, and become famous. In contrast, professor B will linger in obscurity.
This paper argues that a “Matthew effect” drives the high levels of market concentration
observed in the data, with a few superstar firms and many small firms, even when the differences
in productivity among firms are minor. Our “Matthew effect” operates through strategic
complementarities under direct search and monopsony power in the labor market.
Let us unpack these mechanisms. Firms need to sign vendor contracts with their suppliers
before producing. This process involves costly search. For example, to operate an ice cream
truck company, one needs to find a supplier of milk, a supplier of waffle cones, a supplier of
toppings, a supplier of ice cream mixers, a supplier of trucks, etc. This search is costly in terms
of time and resources.1
Intermediate-goods suppliers search with higher effort when they are more productive because
the potential profit from a vendor match is larger. For instance, a high-productivity waffle cone
manufacturer will pay the costs in time and resources of attending a trade fair for the restaurant
industry, but a low-productivity manufacturer will not. Conversely, final-goods producers send
more buying agents when they know that the intermediate-goods suppliers are searching for
buyers. This decision is particularly salient with directed search: i.e., the ice cream company
receives a directory of the booths at the trade fair and, upon seeing that a high-productivity
waffle cone producer is attending the fair, sends an agent to visit that booth right away.
1This example is taken from the fascinating tale of how Mister Softee tried and failed to
establish an ice cream business in Suzhou in the 2000s. See https://supchina.com/podcast/
the-rise-and-fall-of-a-suzhou-soft-serve-baron/.
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Hence, high-productivity intermediate-goods vendors will form more matches with final-goods
firms. In the terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), a strategic complementarity appears because
the stronger the search of the intermediate-goods producers, the stronger the directed search of
the final-goods firms and vice versa.
The search complementarity mechanism will induce a highly concentrated distribution of
firms’ size, vacancies, and output. Small differences in productivities among intermediate-goods
firms will result in large differences in firms’ size and output. Interestingly, this “Matthew
effect” transforms a uniform distribution of idiosyncratic productivity into a highly skewed firm
distribution characterized by the presence of superstar firms. In contrast to much of the existing
literature, we do not need fat tails in the distribution of firms’ idiosyncratic properties (e.g.,
productivity, demand shifters, etc.) to generate this result.
The process, however, does not end here. In our model, there is a second mechanism
reinforcing the “Matthew effect”: the labor market power of large firms. If firm A is the only
waffle cone producer in a region, it has market power when hiring bakers. This market power
creates two effects. First, more productive firms will pay higher wages (as we observe in the
data): the surplus of a labor match is larger and the worker will receive part of it. However,
conditional on productivity, the wages will be a lower share of the surplus. That is, large firms
will have a lower labor income share (again, as we see in the data). The higher the market
power, the stronger these two effects will be.
This labor market power will also have a consequence for search under strategic complemen-
tarities. Since larger firms will keep a higher share of the surplus of a labor match, larger firms
will also have a stronger incentive to search with more intensity (beyond the direct effect of
higher productivity). That higher search intensity will be reinforced by the response of final-good
producers. That is, search complementarities transform labor market power into significant
differences in the market structure and firms’ sizes and output.
The mechanisms outlined above also have significant business cycle implications. After a
negative aggregate productivity shock, firms will decrease their search effort. This fall in search
effort will amplify the original shock and make it more persistent over time. Furthermore, the
reduction in aggregate productivity will affect low-productivity firms disproportionately because
their profit margins are smaller. Thus, low-productivity firms will reduce their search effort
more than high-productivity firms, leading to more market concentration.
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To explore these mechanisms formally, we first develop a simple model that isolates the
effect of search complementarities and monopsony power for the distribution of firms, market
concentration, and the effect of aggregate shocks. The model will not be designed for quantitative
work, but it illustrates all our ideas transparently.
Next, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and frictional
labor markets. At the core of our model, we embed the integration of complex production
processes that require long-lasting vendor relationships among different intermediate- and final-
goods firms. This assumption is motivated by the strong empirical evidence on the existence
of sophisticated multi-firm value-chains. In the model, the intermediate-goods firms manage a
continuum of product lines and search for buyers of those goods. Final-goods producers assign
buying agents to find those product lines and sign contracts with them. The two-sided search
among firms leads to strategic complementarities: intermediate-goods firms’ optimal search
effort increases with the visits of final-goods producers’ buying agents, and vice versa.
Our model is enriched with monopsony power in the labor market by adding search and
matching frictions that let firms set wages below the marginal product of labor. To do so, we
consider a matching technology in the labor market à la Butters (1977), which allows multiple
workers to apply to a single vacancy randomly. This environment provides the firm with the
power to select one worker among multiple job applicants. A firm operating in concentrated
markets can induce workers to accept a low wage, since it could threaten a worker with forgoing
future job offers if the worker declines a wage offer. Intuitively, if a few firms dominate a segment
of the labor market, a prospective employee who rejects a job offer may be excluded de facto
from future consideration, since the firm will prefer other job applicants. Top firms exploit their
market power to offer a low wage and gain profits, which in turn increases profits and encourages
firms with market power to search more actively and attract more visits from potential partners.
Labor market power enhances search complementarities in the goods market and it is a critical
force in generating market concentration.
We calibrate the model to match quarterly U.S. data and then use it as a measurement device.
Given that we want to be consistent with the differences in measured total factor productivity
across manufacturing plants, the rate of factory idleness, and labor market observations, how
much monopsony power do we need to account for market concentration by the top 10% of
firms? From this exercise, we back up a mild degree of monopsony power: the equivalent of
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firms being able to punish workers who reject an offer by turning down their future applications
for around six months. This reasonable degree of monopsony power enhances our trust in the
model as a quantitative laboratory for further exercises.
How can we use our model to think about the recent experience of advanced economies?
Several studies have documented a steady increase in market concentration over the past three
decades. For example, Autor et al. (2020) show that, starting in the early 1980s, sales moved
toward the most productive firms across U.S. industries. At the same time, labor markets
became increasingly dominated by fewer players, lowering the bargaining power of workers and
deepening income inequality (Wu, 2019). Monopsony power in labor markets has also boosted
firm profits and market concentration (Hershbein et al., 2020). Furthermore, the early 1980s
witnessed the onset of the Great Moderation, a sustained period with low volatility.
Our model presents a simple mechanism to jointly account for all these observations: a fall
in the costs of signing vendor contracts. While all firms increase their search effort when the
costs of signing vendor contracts fall, high-productivity firms gain disproportionately, as their
search effort decisions are more non-linear on search costs than those of low-productivity firms.
Thus, in our model, lower search costs lead to i) higher market concentration, ii) lower labor
income shares, iii) more labor market power, and iv) lower responses of output to aggregate
shocks. We observe the same four facts in the U.S. data.
What do we have in mind in terms of lower search costs? Improvements in IT technology.
The internet has made it much easier to identify vendors and suppliers, to manage them, to run
logistics and inventories, to handle sophisticated value-added chains, etc.
While market structure changes the response of the economy to aggregate shocks, the
effect also works in the opposite direction: the market structure is endogenously determined
by the realization of aggregate shocks. The persistently low search effort and output by low-
productivity firms after a large negative aggregate shock result in an increasing market exit
among the production lines owned by these firms. As a result, deep slumps render the market
structure increasingly concentrated.
This behavior also matches the empirical evidence. Using U.S. Census firm-level panel data,
Salgado et al. (2019) show that business cycles are skewed. That is, during recessions, a subset
of firms significantly underperforms, leading to a large fat left tail in the production distribution.
The process is reversed in expansions, when the right tail becomes fatter.
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The market concentration effect of negative aggregate shocks also appears in the customer
base literature. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) find that, during recessions, small (and liquidity
constrained) firms invest less in expanding their customer base and raise prices to boost their
liquidity positions. Bigger firms expand their customer base in recessions, which renders the
market more concentrated afterward. Investment in the customer base resembles network
formation in the context of our model.
Our paper connects with many other different areas of research. First, and most importantly,
there is a tradition of papers exploring firms’ size distribution that goes back to the span-of-
control model by Lucas (1978). One can think about our theory as an endogenous determinant
of the span-of-control: production links must be formed either within firms or between firms.
Directed search and strategic complementarities determine how many of these links are created
in our model.
Our theory has two advantages with respect to a simple span-of-control model. First, we
can generate a larger dispersion in firms’ size that is compatible with observed differences in
measured total factor productivity across plants. Second, our model allows us to have a simple
margin to account for the simultaneous increase in market concentration and fall in the labor
income share: the reduction in direct search costs, which we link with observed improvements in
IT. In a simple span-of-control model, one would need to resort to either production functions
getting closer to linear or a change in the underlying distribution of managerial talent to generate
similar outcomes (see, however, for more flexible versions of the span-of-control model, Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006).
Linked with the Lucas tradition, much recent research focuses on growing market concen-
tration. Aghion et al. (2019) find that IT explains the lower cost of production for bigger
firms, with newer firms (or less efficient ones) finding it increasingly difficult to contest them.
Similarly, Akerman et al. (2013), Bessen (2017), and Unger (2019) attribute this winner-takes-all
mechanism to economies of scale arising from intangible capital and advances in information
technology, which greatly improve the product and inventory logistics.
A second strand of the literature has been devoted to understanding the recent decline in
the labor share of output. See, among many others, Elsby et al. (2013) and Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014). De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) attribute this phenomenon to a raise in
weighted average firm markups, with Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018) emphasizing the role of
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weakening antitrust enforcement. Closer to our work is Autor et al. (2020), who argue that
the decline in the labor share should be attributed to the reallocation of market share toward
“superstar” firms with higher markups. Consistent with this hypothesis Peters (2020) finds that
markups vary systematically across firms, with incumbents investing to increase productivity
growth (further raising markups). However, a creative destruction mechanism also exists in this
last paper, as new and more efficient firms displace incumbents. Higher entry costs or frictions
may thus deter this key pro-competitiveness mechanism.
Third, our paper also contributes to the growing theoretical literature on monopsony in labor
markets. Examples include Ashenfelter et al. (2010), Berger et al. (2019), Manning (2011), Card
et al. (2018), and Lamadon et al. (2019). In turn, empirical papers finding substantial market
power in the labor market include Azar et al. (2019), Falch (2010), Ransom and Sims (2010),
and Matsudaira (2014).
Fourth, starting with the seminal contributions of Diamond (1982) and Weitzman (1982),
several papers have linked strategic complementarities to aggregate fluctuations. See, without
being exhaustive, Diamond and Fudenberg (1989), Huo and Rı́os-Rull (2013), and Kaplan
and Menzio (2016). We depart, though, from those papers in our focus on how strategic
complementarities and monopsony power create a “Matthew effect” on market concentration
and analyze how those mechanisms interact with aggregate shocks.
Finally, in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2019), we explore how fiscal policy and strategic
complementarities interplay to explain the persistence of both the business cycle and the
unemployment rate. Our previous work abstract from firm heterogeneity, market concentration,
and monopsonistic labor markets. It focuses, instead, on the possibility of multiple equilibria,
which do not play any role in the current paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model to
outline the main ideas in our paper. Section 3 extends the simple model to a more fleshed-out
dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 4 calibrates the model to U.S. data and uses it to
measure monopsony power in the labor market. Section 5 presents our quantitative findings.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 A simple model
We start our analysis by presenting a simple model, with a closed-form solution, that embodies
the central mechanisms we want to explore. The model begets search complementarities through
the interplay of directed search and endogenous search effort. We will extend this simple model
along two dimensions. First, we will incorporate endogenous variations in market concentration
through the entry and exit of product lines. Second, we will introduce monopsony power in the
labor market to evaluate how such a power interrelates with market concentration. While neither
the simple model nor its extensions are designed for quantitative work (we will impose restrictive
functional forms and parametric choices), the mechanisms that drive the results are transparent.
In Section 3, we will present an extended model that gives us quantitative predictions.
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and infinite. The economy is composed of J + 1 islands. Each island j ∈
{1, 2, ..., J} hosts an intermediate-goods producer (I), such as General Mills or Kellogg’s. Each
intermediate-goods producer operates a unitary measure of product lines, such as the many food
brands manufactured by General Mills, and has an idiosyncratic productivity shock xj. The
central island J + 1 hosts a representative household and a final-goods producer (F ), such as
Walmart, that purchases food items from General Mills.
The intermediate-goods producers and the final-goods producer must form a vendor relation-
ship before starting production, e.g., General Mills will not produce breakfast cereals if it does
not have access to a supermarket in which to sell them. The intermediate-goods producer either
does not have the technology to reach consumers directly or it is too costly for it to do so. In
fact, General Mills and similar firms do not sell directly to final consumers.
The process of search to form vendor relationships is directed. At the start of each period t,
the firm F decides how many buying agents to send to each island to maximize its total profits.
The firm F can pick any positive real number of buying agents.
Production begins when a buying agent from firm F signs a contract with a single product
line in firm I. In our example, Walmart decides how many buying agents to send to General
Mills. Each Walmart buying agent will work with a General Mills brand manager to reach a
vendor contract for that brand. The more buying agents Walmart sends, the more contracts
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can be signed. The buying agent, in real life, is a bundle of different workers (from logistics,
legal, marketing). For our purposes, we can ignore that margin, since we focus on Walmart’s
total buying cost. The number of active product lines is equal to the number of buying agents
that sign a contract. The total output for each signed contract is 2ztxj , where zt is an aggregate
productivity shock in period t. Output is equally split between firm F and firm I.
Buying agents who fail to sign a contract with a product line in firm I withdraw from the
island, while the unmatched product line of firm I stays idle for the period. A law of large
numbers holds in the economy and, thus, probabilities equate to realized shares. That is, if the
equilibrium implies a 0.32 probability of meeting on any island j, a match occurs in 32% of
product lines on this island.
The representative household owns all the firms in the economy, receives the aggregate
net profits from them, and consumes. Since our paper focuses on firm heterogeneity, the
representative household assumption simplifies our analysis.
At the end of each period t, all the vendor matches are dissolved, buying agents from firm F
return to their headquarters, and the searching process restarts ex novo in period t+ 1. This
assumption transforms the dynamic programming problem of the firms into a sequence of static
optimization problems. Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the economy.
Island 2
Island 1 
 Firm I 
 Product       Product       Product 
Line           Line          Line 
+               Vendor Contract 
Buying       Buying      Buying 
Agent        Agent       Agent 
Firm F Island 3
Island 2
Figure 1: Structure of the economy
A matching function determines the probability of meeting a vendor and signing a contract.
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The likelihood of matching on each island j depends on the measure of buying agents from firm
F , nFj , the measure of product lines owned by firm I, n
I
j , and the effort firm I exerts in finding
a buying agent from firm F , σIj ∈ [0, 1] (to save on notation, we will only use a subindex t for a
variable when needed to avoid confusion). More precisely, the measure of newly formed matches
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We pick a power of 3 in the function above for algebraic convenience, but all we need is convexity
of the search cost.
Firm F pays a unit cost of sending buying agents equal to κ, which we normalize to κ = φ/2.














To find the Nash equilibria, we consider the problem of firm I on island j that takes the measure
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with respect to σIj , we obtain the best response function for firm









Let us consider now the problem of firm F . Since the search process in the intermediate-goods
market is directed, firm F sends enough buyers to visit island j to exploit all profit opportunities.
Hence, firm F ’s income from sending an additional buying agent to an island (the matching
probability times the revenue per signed contract) is equal to the unit cost of sending the agent




Equations (4) and (5) show why we have strategic search complementarities in the sense of
Bulow et al. (1985): firm I’s search effort is (weakly) increasing in firm F ’s number of buying
agents (equation 4) and firm F ’s number of buying agents is an affine function of firm I’s search
effort (equation 5). A bigger search effort from firm I on island j increases the profits for firm
F and, thus, attracts a larger measure of buying agents to the island, raising the profits for firm
I and further stimulating search effort.
Directed search is at the core of this result: firm F ’s decision depends on firm I on island j’s
search effort because firm F can direct its buying agents to island j. With random search, an
increment in the search effort of firm I on island j would only affect firm F ’s decision by changing
the revenue of an additional contract on island j times the probability that the additional buying
agent would arrive at the island. When J is large, the effect would be negligible.














= {0, 0}, is not very interesting and we will ignore it. Also, at the cost of
some extra notation, we could assume that a minimum number of matches occur even when
σIj = 0 and this equilibrium would disappear.
















. Then, equation (1) implies that the
output on island j is 2φ3z6t x
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Equation (6) reveals how a ∆ difference in productivity leads to a ∆6 difference in output.
The degree of amplification, 6, is determined by the curvature of the search cost function
(equation 2). We can increase or decrease the amplification effect by adjusting the search cost
function.
To illustrate these derivations, we fix the number of islands j to 3 for the rest of this section.
We set φ = 0.51/3, which implies that, when ztxj = 1, the matching probability for firm I is 0.5.
For the moment, zt = 1. With this choice of parameter values, output on island j is x
6
j . Just for









































Figure 2: Nash equilibria across islands
Figure 2 plots the best response function of firm I on each island (continuous blue line) and
the optimality condition of firm F regarding the number of buying agents sent to the island
(discontinuous red line). In the left panel, we plot the functions for island 1; in the center panel,
we plot the functions for island 2; and in the right panel, we plot the functions for island 3. The






, for each island.
As implied by equations (4) and (5), higher productivity triggers strong strategic comple-
mentarities and a “Matthew effect” of degree 6. While island 3 is only 10.5% more productive
than island 1, it exerts 22% more search effort and attracts 35% more visits from firm F than
12













= (0.88, 0.92, 1.34).
A similar amplification appears after an aggregate productivity shock. The left panel of
Figure 3 plots a one-period aggregate productivity shock that decreases zt from its original
value of 1 to 0.95 in the second period and fully recovers in the third period. The right panel
of Figure 3 plots the impulse-response function (IRF) of output to the shock in the left panel
in each of our three islands. A reduction of 5% in aggregate productivity results in a 26% fall
in output. Given our strong parametric assumptions, the reduction in output is proportional
across islands and independent of zt and κ (the unit cost of sending buying agents). Also, the
response of output to aggregate productivity has no persistence. The lack of persistence occurs
because, in this version of the model, the distribution of island size is exogenous.
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Figure 3: IRFs to negative aggregate productivity shock
In comparison, the extended model with the endogenous entry of product lines we will discuss
in the next subsection will generate i) changes in market concentration after a productivity
shock or a reduction in κ, and ii) a sluggish adjustment process and a persistent response of
output to aggregate productivity shocks. These two phenomena will make the “Matthew effect”
even more potent and give us a theory, through the reduction in κ, to account for increased
market concentration. Let us, then, enrich our simple model by introducing entry and exit of
product lines for intermediate-goods firm I.
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2.3 Endogenous market concentration
We show now that the entry and exit margin will deliver three new results: i) the “Matthew
effect” becomes even more prominent than before; ii) market concentration will depend on
the cost of signing a vendor contract; and iii) aggregate productivity shocks change market
concentration and make the effects of short-lived aggregate shocks persistent and asymmetric.
We assume that unmatched product lines of the firm in sector I on each island j become
obsolete and exit the economy with probability χ. Conversely, new product lines are created
at the constant rate n in each period t. This assumption can be micro-founded with a fixed
operation cost with a cash-on-hand constraint: in the absence of a positive cash flow, the product
line is forced to close. To simplify, we will assume that firms decide on search effort without
accounting for the possibility that forgoing a match may make them obsolete in the next period
(we will remove this simplification in Section 3). For simplicity, the entry rate is exogenous. Our
results hold, with heavier notation, if entry is endogenous.
The measure of product lines on each island j follows:
nIj,t+1 = n
I





















is the fraction of unmatched product lines that exit island i, and n







. Thus, the exit rate for product lines is lower on an island with a higher
probability of establishing a vendor contract with firm F , leading to a subsequent higher measure








We set χ = 0.282 to generate a steady-state measure of product lines on island 3 of 1 that is
consistent with that in our previous subsection (i.e., a steady-state measure of product lines
equals 0.58 and 0.72 on islands 1 and 2, respectively). Figure 4 shows that the steady-state
output share on islands 1, 2, and 3 is equal to 0.17, 0.29, and 0.54, respectively. While island 3
is still only 10.5% more productive than island 1 (as in the case without entry-exit), island 3’s
output is now 209% larger than island 2’s output, instead of 82% as without entry-exit. Equation
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(8) tells us why. Due to its higher productivity, island 3 searches more actively, attracts more
vendors, and accumulates more product lines. As πIj gets close to one, this mechanism becomes















Figure 4: Output share across islands
But market concentration also depends on the cost of signing a vendor contract. For example,
imagine that due to the enhancements in search technology (e.g., better logistics software), it
becomes cheaper for firm F to send buying agents to each island. Formally, we let the unit cost
of visiting each island, κ, decrease at a constant 1% rate per period (i.e., κt = 0.99
t−1 · φ/2).








Unit cost of visiting island





























Figure 5: Reduction in search costs
Figure 5 plots the unit cost of visiting each island (left panel), the measure of productive lines
for firm I (central panel), and the final output share (right panel) for each island. The decline in
unit search cost attracts more buying agents from firm F to all islands and, thus, increases the
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probability of forming a vendor relationship and the number of active product lines (nIj,t, middle
panel). While all three islands have more active product lines, search complementarities make
the increase in nIj,t proportional to each island’s productivity. Therefore, island 3 benefits the
most from the decline in κ and the output shares of islands 1 and 2 fall over time. In comparison,
in the model without entry and exit, the output on all three islands grows at the same rate, and
market concentration remains unchanged. That is, we need both search complementarities and
entry-exit to transform reductions in search cost into changes in market concentration.
Our result is consistent with the finding in Aghion et al. (2019), who show that the increasing
share of output for high-productivity firms is mostly accounted for by a decreasing cost of
expanding new businesses. Consider the following example. Historically, each Whole Foods
store sourced its products with independent local suppliers (or “local foragers”). Following the
Amazon-Whole Foods merger, Amazon took advantage of its leadership in logistics software
to revamp the existing Whole Foods vendor contract arrangements and started prioritizing
contracts with national, higher-productivity suppliers at the expense of local foragers.
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Figure 6: IRFs to negative aggregate productivity shock
Figure 6 shows the IRFs of the measure nIj,t and output yj,t on the three islands (right panel)
to a one-period decrease in aggregate productivity (zt) from 1 to 0.95 (left panel). Output
(aggregate and on each island) falls by 26%, as in the case without entry and exit: both versions
of the model behave in the same way at impact. The difference with respect to Figure 3 is that
now, through entry and exit, we have i) persistence of the fall in output (even if the productivity
shock only lasts for one period) and that ii) such persistence is asymmetric across islands.
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2.4 Monopsony power of the labor market
Motivated by the evidence in Berger et al. (2019), Hershbein et al. (2020), and Manning (2020),
among others, that links monopsony power in the labor market and market concentration, we
investigate how search complementarities and monopsony power interact. We will derive five new
results: i) monopsony power lowers wages ceteris paribus; ii) wages grow with the productivity
of the firm; iii) monopsony power reduces the marginal effect of the firm’s productivity on wages;
iv) monopsony power strengthens the “Matthew effect” of productivity differences even further
and increases wage inequality; and v) reductions in the cost of signing a vendor contract lower
labor income share, but redistributes labor toward higher-productivity jobs.
Our first step before showing these results is to specify labor supply and demand. To keep the
model as transparent as possible, we assume that, after the formation of vendor relationships, a







j,t). The labor match lasts for one period and separates at the end of each period.
Thus, the meeting probability is equal to one for both sides of the match. A worker’s probability








k,t, the share of active
product lines on island j.2
The wage on island j, wj,t, is determined by Nash bargaining between the worker and an
active product line. If the worker rejects the wage offer, she becomes unemployed in this period
and the active product line receives a zero profit.
To introduce monopsony power on the labor market, we assume that active product lines on
the same island negotiate wages in a collective way: if a worker rejects an offer from an active
product line on island j, all other active product lines on island j would “punish” the worker by
refusing to match with her with probability λ in the next period. For simplicity, we assume that
firms have an exogenous commitment to this negotiation rule.
Then, if a worker declines a wage offer from an active product line, she forgoes wj,t + λsj,t+1 ·
wj,t+1, the lost wage today plus the probability of losing a wage tomorrow, is proportional to the
island’s labor market share, sj,t+1. Firms will optimally take advantage of this forgone income
to increase their profits.













j,t. By doing so, we eliminate the need to keep track of the percentage of
unmatched workers or product lines. We can justify the number of workers being a function of the active product
lines with the representative household’s preferences without wealth effects.
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To see this, notice that the total surplus of a labor market match is LTSj,t = (2ztxj − wj,t) +
(wj,t + λsj,t+1wj,t+1), where (2ztxj − wj,t) and (wj,t + sj,t+1 · wj,t+1) are the surplus of the active
product line and the worker’s payoff from the labor market match, respectively (here we
implicitly assume linear preferences on income for the worker). Nash bargaining implies that
2ztxj − wj,t = τ · LTSj,t and wj,t + λsj,t+1 · wj,t+1 = (1− τ)LTSj,t, where τ and (1− τ) are the
bargaining shares of the active product line and the worker, respectively.
Suppose, first, that labor market punishment is forbidden, i.e., λ = 0. In this case, the wage
in the steady state (with zt = z = 1), w
∗
j = (1− τ) 2xj, is a fraction 1 − τ of output. The
derivative of the wage with respect to the island’s productivity xj is (1− τ) 2.










where we can see the monopsony wedge 1
1+τλsj
< 1.3










< (1− τ) 2. (10)




Equations (9) and (10) teach us three lessons. First, the monopsony wedge lowers the island’s
wage i with respect to the case without monopsony power. Second, wj increases with the
island’s productivity, but decreases with the island’s share of active product lines. The latter
change is a general equilibrium effect: the island’s share depends on its productivity but also
on the productivity of all the other firms in the economy. That is, if firms on other islands are
more productive, they will decrease the number of workers on the current island and, therefore,
suppress search efforts and wages. Third, wages grow more slowly than productivity in the firms’
cross-section.
Figure 7 illustrates these three lessons by plotting the distribution of wages in the steady
state of the economy (zt = z = 1) with no monopsony power (λ = 0) and with monopsony
power (λ = 0.1). Since we calibrate τ = 0.5, we have (1− τ) 2zt = 1. To make our exercise
3In particular, LTSj = 2xj + λsjwj and 2xj − wj = τ · LTSj . By combining the two equations, we get:
2xj − wj = τ (2xj + λsjwj), or wj = (1− τ) 2xj .
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comparable with the previous subsections, we reset x1 = 1.9, x2 = 2, and x3 = 2.1. Then, when
labor market punishment is forbidden, firms’ profits and the Nash equilibrium are then the same















No monopsony power ( =0)
Monopsony power ( =0.1)
Figure 7: Wage with different λ
Figure 7 shows how, when λ = 0, wages grow one-to-one with productivity: w1 = 1.9,
w2 = 2, and w3 = 2.1. However, under monopsony power, wages i) are lower, ii) and grow more
slowly than productivity: w1 = 1.89, w2 = 1.98, and w3 = 2.04. The wedge between wages and
productivity is increasing in the island’s output share.
We move now to analyze the effects of monopsony power on market concentration. As before,








j,t (ztxj − wj,t/2) . (12)
With monopsony power, firms pay a lower wage and achieve a higher profit. This higher
profit provides firms with a higher incentive to search. Figure 8 documents this result by plotting
the steady-state output share for each island. In the left panel, we plot the distribution of output
shares when λ = 0, which is the same as in Figure 4. In the right panel, we plot the distribution
of output shares when λ = 0.1. The incremental incentive of search is highest for island 3 as it
has the greatest effective labor market power due to its size, and is lowest for island 1. As a
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result, labor market power intensities market concentration. Island 3’s share of output grows
































Monopsony power ( =0.1)
Figure 8: Output share with different λ
This additional strengthening of the “Matthew effect” stands in contrast to the results from
a classic model of monopsony in the labor market. In such a classic model, monopsony leads to
a smaller firm, since the monopsonist wants to equate the marginal revenue product of labor to
the marginal cost of labor by reducing labor hired. In our model, the monopsonist wants to hire
more workers, because a larger size allows it to keep more of the total surplus.
Another way to think about this mechanism is that a higher λ leads to a lower labor income
share: firms that keep a larger share of the labor surplus grow more in size. When λ = 0,
the labor income share is 0.5 (the Nash bargaining parameter). When λ = 0.1, the labor
income share is 0.49. But, although the share of labor income is lower, the total labor income
is 33% higher. Labor income share falls because, when λ = 0.1, we are providing incentives
for higher-productivity firms to scale up and relocate more workers from the low-wage jobs on
islands 1 and 2 to the highest-wage jobs on island 3.
We should be careful mapping our results to findings from a cross-sectional regression of
wages on labor market power such as those in Marinescu et al. (2020). In our model, all firms
have the same monopsony power. Thus, our model’s predictions are about two economies with
different monopsony power in the labor market (e.g., the U.S. vs. France), not about two firms
within the same economy. To think about the latter case, we would need to consider some
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Figure 9: Labor income share with different λ
Figure 9 displays the aggregate labor income share for different values of κ and λ. As we
move over the λ-axis, we see the labor share reduction described above. But, interestingly,
Figure 9 shows that our model has another mechanism to account for the recent reduction in the
labor share in the U.S. economy: a fall in κ. As we move over the κ-axis, the labor income share
falls, but output and productivity increase. Since a fall in the cost of signing vendor contracts
leads to higher market concentration, it will also lead to firms’ higher market power.
Thus, our model predicts that changes such as better software and other technologies to
manage vendors and suppliers deliver i) more market concentration and ii) lower labor income
share but also iii) higher average wages and iv) higher productivity. More pointedly, our model
also suggests that the differences observed between the U.S. and Europe over the last decades in
terms of market concentration, labor income shares, and wage and productivity growth may be
due to differences in the speed of adopting information technologies that allow for a cheaper
scale-up of businesses on each side of the Atlantic.4 Also, European labor market regulations
might limit the extent to which European firms can exert their monopsony power in the labor
market, limiting their ability to scale up production.
Figure 10 displays the wage distribution for different values of κ and λ. In each plot, the
vertical top-circled line presents workers’ density for each wage, and the vertical discontinuous
line, the average wage. Either a higher λ or a lower κ makes the market structure more
concentrated and, therefore, allocates more workers to more productive firms (i.e., an increase in
the height of the vertical line at the right). However, λ and κ have different effects on the level
4For some empirical documentation of these differences, see Cette et al. (2019) and Covarrubias et al. (2019).
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of wages. A higher λ generally decreases the wage for every worker (i.e., shifts all the vertical
lines to the left) and increases wage inequality: more workers move to higher-wage jobs. In








































































































Figure 10: Wage distribution with different λ
We finish this subsection with Figure 11, which is the analogous to Figure 6 but with
monopsony power. Aggregate output falls 27% at impact and, as before, the IRFs show
persistence. As in Figure 6, island 3 is the one that experiences the largest output over time.
However, our simple model ignores an important factor of wage bargaining. The stronger market
power of high-productivity firms can increase the outside option value of low-productivity firms’
employees by making it easier to find high-paying jobs, which lowers the low-productivity firms’
profit margin. In the extended model, this mechanism can make low-productivity firms more
responsive to productivity shocks.
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Figure 11: IRFs to a negative aggregate productivity shock
2.5 Taking stock
We can now summarize the eight main takeaways from our simple model:
1. Search complementarities, under directed search, result in a “Matthew effect” that trans-
forms small differences in productivity into large output differences.
2. Entry and exit make the “Matthew effect” even more prominent.
3. Entry and exit make the degree of market concentration depend on the cost of signing
a vendor contract. This observation gives us a theory of why market concentration has
been growing in the U.S. economy: the fall in search costs related to business relationships
(better logistics software, improved inventory control, easier database management).
4. Monopsony power in the labor market strengthens the “Matthew effect” across firms. In
our model, search complementarities imply that firms want to get bigger and hire more
workers to keep more of the surplus. This result stands in stark contrast with the classic
monopsony model, in which firms want to reduce the amount of labor they hire, which
leads to relatively smaller firms.
5. Monopsony power lowers wages for a given level of productivity, and the percentage of
reduction grows with the firm size.
6. Higher monopsony power increases wage inequality by redistributing workers to larger,
more productive firms.
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7. Reductions in the cost of signing a vendor contract lower the labor income share, but shift
workers’ distribution toward high-wage jobs.
8. With entry and exit and monopsony power, aggregate productivity shocks change market
concentration, generating a long persistence of the effects of short-lived aggregate shocks.
Let us analyze how these takeaways appear in our extended, quantitative model.
3 Extended model
In this section, we enrich our simple model along three important dimensions. First, we broaden
the analysis to general equilibrium by including utility-maximizing households that choose
consumption and labor supply and allowing for a richer heterogeneity in intermediate-goods
producers. Second, we introduce persistence in vendor relationships. Third, we flesh out the
monopsony power in the labor market to be consistent with the granular search theory in Jarosch
et al. (2019).
3.1 The representative household




βt [log (Ct) + ξ (1− ht)] , (13)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ξ ≥ 0 is the marginal disutility of labor, Ct is consumption
of final goods, and ht is total hours worked in the household (defined below). The time constraint
is normalized to one. Total hours worked is equal to ht =
∑
j n̂j,thj,t, where n̂j,t represents the
fraction of households working in a j-type product line. The household’s budget constraint is
Ct =
∑
j n̂j,twj,thj,t + Πt, where wj,t and hj,t are the wage rate and the labor supply in a j-type
product line, respectively. Πt is the per-capita profit from ownership of firms. The wage is
different across product lines because of the search and matching frictions.
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3.2 The labor market and the goods market: An overview
There are j = 1, 2, ..., J types of firms in the intermediate-goods sector I, and each j-type firm
manufactures identical intermediate goods using a technology with different productivity. We
denote the idiosyncratic productivity for firm I of type j as xj. Without loss of generality,
we assume strictly increasing idiosyncratic productivity in the index of firm type (i.e., x1 <
x2 < ... < xJ). Each firm I manages a positive measure of product lines, which we interpret
as firm size. The distribution of firm size is endogenously determined by search-matching and
entry-exit processes, as we describe below. A law of large numbers holds in this economy,
equating individual probabilities with realized shares.
To manufacture goods, a product line must first form a vendor relationship with a final-goods
producer (firm F ) and match with a worker. Firms in the final-goods sector F have the same
productivity. Each firm sends buying agents to form vendor relationships with product lines
that supply intermediate goods to them. Search is directed, and each firm in sector F optimally
chooses the j-type firm in sector I to visit. Since J types of firm I exist, there are J segmented
inter-firm submarkets, indexed by j. Sending a buying agent to submarket j incurs the unit cost
κ. Each firm I in submarket j chooses the costly search effort, denoted by σIj,t, to maximize
profits. Variable search effort and directed search generate strategic complementarities since the
optimal search effort exerted by firm I is increasing in the measure of buying agents sent by
firm F . Similarly, the optimal measure of buying agents sent by firm F will also be increasing
in the search effort exerted by firm I.
After a vendor relationship is formed, each vendor relationship without a worker posts one
vacancy (without any costs) in the labor market and stays idle. At the end of each period,
vendor relationships and labor market matches separate exogenously with probability δ̂ and δ,
respectively, and in either case, workers become unemployed.
Figure 12 summarizes the timeline for firm I. At the beginning of each period, product lines
search for buying agents to establish a vendor relationship. Next, vendor relationships search for
workers. If successfully matched with a worker, the vendor relationship enters the production
stage; otherwise it stays idle. Vendor relationships and labor market matches separate randomly
at the end of each period.
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Vendor-relation and labor 
market match continue
Vendor-relation expires
Labor market match 
separates
Fail to match with 
worker: 
Stay idle in this periodVendor-relation 
formation fails
Inter-firm matching Labor market matching 
Figure 12: Timeline for firm I
3.3 The labor market: Search frictions and monopsony power
3.3.1 Matching function
We assume a frictional labor market. We depart from the DMP framework by allowing multiple
workers to apply for a single vacancy randomly. With this simple variation, we give firms
monopsony power in the labor market because they can threaten to preclude workers who decline
a wage offer from future job offers. Therefore, the bargained wage may be below the marginal
product of labor.
The matching technology is formulated by the process of randomly placing balls in urns
as in Butters (1977). Product lines play the role of urns and workers the role of balls. An
urn becomes “productive” when it has a ball in it. Even with the same number of urns and
balls, a random placing of the balls in the urns will not match all the pairs exactly because of a
coordination failure by those placing the balls in the urns. Some urns will end up with more
than one ball and some with none. In the context of the labor market, if only one worker could
occupy each job, an uncoordinated application process by workers will lead to overcrowding in
some jobs and to no applications in others. As illustrated by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001),
the imperfection that leads to unemployment in this environment is the lack of information
about other workers’ action.
In the simplest version of this process, we assume that workers and vendor relationships
are discrete. There are ut number of unemployed workers who know the location of vt number
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of unmatched product lines. If a product line receives one or more job applications, it selects
one applicant and forms a match (the selection criterion is specified below), while the other
applicants become unemployed in the current period t.
Given that each product line receives a worker’s application with probability 1/ñt, and there
are ut applicants, with probability (1− 1/vt)ut a given product line will receive no applications.
Thus, the number of labor market matches formed in each period is Et = vt [1− (1− 1/vt)ut ].
We let the measure of each product line and worker be infinitely small, such that ñt and ut









= 1− e−ut/vt ,









To introduce labor market power, we adopt a “granular search” approach proposed by
Jarosch et al. (2019), who show that large firms hold a strong bargaining power by threatening
workers with future job refusals, since workers can hardly avoid large employers and they are
likely to re-apply for job openings from the same firms in the future. We denote the measure of
vendor relationships managed by the type-j firms that are not matched with a worker as vj,t,
which we interpret as a proxy for the size of the labor market. Thus, the number of unmatched
product lines is vt =
∑J
j=1 vj,t. We define the relative labor market size, sj,t, as the fraction
of unfilled product lines owned by type-j firms with sj,t = vj,t/vt and
∑J
j=1 sj,t = 1, which is
endogenously determined. In general, a more productive firm and a firm that searches more
actively gain a higher sj,t that generates stronger labor market power.
The dynamics in the model depend on three probabilities. First, the conditional probability
pn that a worker meeting a product line is not the only applicant for the job opening. Second,
the probability s · pu that a worker meets with a product line owned by a large firm (that
possesses the fraction s of matched product lines of the economy). Third, the probability that a
worker contacts a product line owned by the same firm and that the product line has more than
one job applicant: s · pu · pn.
Labor market matches separate exogenously with probability δ. In addition, if a product
line becomes obsolete (with probability δ̂), the labor market match terminates.
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3.3.2 Monopsony power and value functions
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining. The bargaining set is within the product line’s
output yj,t and the disutility of working ξhj,t. When multiple homogeneous workers apply for a
single vacancy, the product line offers a wage contract to one candidate. The product line exerts
its monopsony power by threatening the worker with forgoing future hiring if the current offer is
rejected. This threat is potent when the product line belongs to a firm of large size, since job
applicants are likely to re-encounter the same firm in the future with a probability proportional
to relative labor market size (sj). Thus, more productive (and therefore larger) firms retain a
stronger threatening power.
The firm that operates the product line precludes workers who reject a current job offer from
future hiring with probability δ̃, such that the mean duration of the punishment is 1/δ̃ periods.
To rule out the complicated case in which a worker is punished by multiple firms, we assume
that firms withdraw punishment to workers once a worker is hired by other product lines.
We now define the Bellman equations that determine the value of an unemployed worker
without punishment Ut, of an unemployed worker punished by a type-j firm Ũj,t, of an employed
worker in a type-j firm Wj,t, of a product line owned by a type-j firm that is matched with a
worker Jj,t, and of a product line that is not matched with a worker Xj,t.
The value of an unemployed worker without punishment is:








sk,tWk,t+1 + (1− put )Ut+1
]
, (14)
where ξ is the flow of utility from being unemployed in period t. In t+1, with probability put ·sk,t,
the worker finds a job in a k-type product line or, with probability 1− put , remains unemployed.
The continuation value is discounted by the stochastic discount factor, β (Ct/Ct+1).











k 6=j sk,tWk,t+1 + sj,t (1− pnt )Wj,t+1
]
+ (1− put + put sj,tpnt ) Ũj,t+1

 , (15)
where, with probability δ̃, the punishment of the worker is forgiven and the value of unemployment
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becomes Uj,t. Otherwise, the worker continues under punishment. In this case, with probability
put · sk,t, the worker finds a job in a type-k product line (k 6= j) and, with probability put · sj,t,
the worker is hired by a type-j product line. This last hiring occurs because either the firm
is not the one enforcing the punishment, or if it is, the firm has no other applications for the
job. Finally, with probability (1− put + put sj,tpnt ), the worker remains unemployed. This occurs
because either the worker fails to meet any vacancy or the worker meets a type-j product line,
but the product line has alternative applicants and, thus, rejects the worker.
By multiplying equation (14) by (1− δ̃) and subtracting equation (15) from it, we obtain
the loss of value associated with labor market punishment:








) sj,tput pnt (Wj,t+1 − Ut+1)




In the deterministic steady state, equation (16) reduces to:





upn (Wj − U)




Equation (17) shows that if δ̃ = 1, there is no labor market punishment and U = Ũj. If
δ̃ < 1, however, equation (15) implies that U > Ũj, that is, labor market punishment generates
a loss to the worker, since she prefers working to being unemployed (i.e., Wj > U). Moreover,
equation (17) shows that the loss of value due to labor market punishment strictly increases
with the firm’s relative labor market size (sj), and strictly decreases with the probability of
forgiving (δ̃). When the firm’s labor market size is zero, U = Ũj.
The value of an employed worker in a vendor relationship is:














where the first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (18) is the current period wage
wj,t to be determined by Nash bargaining. The job relationship terminates randomly because
either the job separates with probability δ or the vendor relationship dissolves with probability
δ̂. In both instances, the worker becomes unemployed and gains value Ut+1. Otherwise, the
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worker continues the job relationship and earns value Wj,t+1.
















, k ∈ {I, F} , (19)
where the first term on the RHS of equation (19) is current profit, and the second term is the
continuation value in the next period t+ 1, in which the job separates with probability δ and
the idle vendor relationship gets Xkj,t+1 (defined below), or the vendor relationship dissolves with
probability δ̃ and each firm gets J̃kt+1.








j,t+1 + (1− pnt )Xkj,t+1
]
, k ∈ {I, F} . (20)
Equation (20) shows that an idle product line produces zero profits in period t, but by hiring a
worker, with probability pnt , it receives the value J
k
j,t+1. Otherwise, with probability (1− pnt ),
the product line remains unmatched and earning Xkj,t+1 in the next period t+ 1.
The value of a product line without a vendor relationship is:











(1− χ) J̃ Ij,t+1
]
. (21)
Equation (21) shows that a product line without a vendor relationship exerts search effort in
period t, and in the next period t+ 1, finds a firm in sector I with probability πIj,t that yields
a value XIj,t+1. Otherwise, and if it survives obsolescence with probability (1− χ), it remains
without a vendor relationship and yields a value of J̃ Ij,t+1.
Lastly, when a vendor relationship terminates, the buying agent of firm F returns to the
central island and receives zero value:
J̃Fj,t = 0 (22)
Firms split the joint profit from the match by Nash bargaining, which yields:







where Xkj,t − J̃kj,t is the capital gain by signing a vendor contract. The parameter τ is the
bargaining share of firm I.
3.3.3 Wage determination
The wage is negotiated between the worker and the vendor relationship by Nash bargaining.
The total surplus from forming a match in the labor market (LTSj,t) is equal to:









j,t, and Xj,t =
XIj,t +X
F
j,t. Equation (24) departs from the standard bargaining protocols because the worker
surplus depends on Ũj,t rather than Ut, and the additional surplus (Ut − Ũj,t) arises from the
firm’s credible threat of future rejection.
Thus, given a vendor relationship’s bargaining share τ̃ , the bargained wage (wj,t) satisfies:
Wj,t − Ũj,t = (1− τ̃)LTSj,t, (25)
and
Jj,t −Xj,t = τ̃LTSj,t. (26)
In the online appendix, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the steady state, ceteris paribus, the wage decreases with the firm’s vacancy
share (sj) and increases with the probability of forgiveness (δ̃).
Proposition 1 shows that, conditional on a level of productivity, greater market power –either
because a firm represents a larger share in the labor market or because a firm has a lower
probability of forgiveness– implies a lower wage.
3.4 The goods market: Vendor contract formation
As in the simple model, the matching process in each submarket is governed by a technology
with variable search intensity. Following Burdett and Mortensen (1980), the number of newly














, where σIj,t is
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firm I’s variable search effort, ñFj,t is the measure of firm F ’s buying agents, and ñ
I
j,t is the
measure of product lines owned by type-j firm I. The parameter ψ controls the efficiency in
matching. The function H (·) has constant returns to scale and it is strictly increasing in both
arguments.




j,t. The probability that a











= ψσIj,tµ (θj,t) ,












= ψσIj,tq (θj,t) ,
where µ (θj,t) = H (θj,t, 1) and q (θj,t) = H (1, 1/θj,t). Then, µ
′ (θj,t) > 0 and q
′ (θj,t) < 0.










, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} .
3.4.1 Production technology
A product line manufactures intermediate goods according to the production technology:
ỹj,t = xjhj,t, (27)
where ỹj,t is the output for firms in the intermediate-goods sector (a tilde indicates intermediate-
goods sector variables), and xj is the idiosyncratic productivity for type-j intermediate-goods
producer. Each product line matches with one worker and hours are fixed to one (i.e., hj,t = 1).
Final-goods producers transform the intermediate goods into the final goods yj,t with the
linear production technology:
yj,t = zỹj,t = zxj, (28)
where z is the level of aggregate productivity.








j,t are the wage of the
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worker, the profits of the product line, and the profits of the final-goods producer (conditional
on vendor relationship formation and labor market matching), respectively.
3.4.2 Optimal search effort for intermediate goods producers
The product line chooses the optimal search effort by maximizing the value J̃j,t:
max
σIj,t≥0











(1− χ) J̃ Ij,t+1
]
, (29)
where πIj,t is the probability of forming a vendor relationship. Jj,t (0) and Jj,t (1) are the ex-post
value of a product line defined in equation (19), conditional on the success and failure of a












where ∆Jj,t is the capital gain due to the establishment of a vendor contract:
∆Jj,t+1 = X
I
j,t+1 − (1− χ) J̃ Ij,t+1, (31)
which includes the capital gain XIj,t+1 − J̃ Ij,t+1, and the gain χJ̃ Ij,t+1 from a product line with a
vendor contract avoiding obsolescence.
The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (30) is the marginal cost of exerting search effort to
form a vendor relationship for a j-type firm in sector I, and the RHS of the equation is the
benefit of signing a vendor contract, which increases in tightness θj,t (since µ
′ (θj,t) > 0) and in
the capital gain from forming a vendor relationship.














Since ν > 1 and µ (·) is an increasing function, equation (32) shows that the optimal search
intensity σIj,t increases with the tightness ratio θj,t, implying that σ
I
j,t > 0.
In the online appendix, we show that strong market power –either because a firm owns
a larger share in the labor market, or because it exercises a lower probability of forgiveness–
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implies a greater search effort (conditional on a level of productivity and the number of agents
visiting from sector F ).
Proposition 2. In the steady state, ceteris paribus, firm I’s search effort increases with the
firm’s vacancy share sj, and it decreases with the probability of forgiveness δ̃.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 establishes that strong labor market power enables firms to offer
a lower wage to the worker, which expands the firm’s profit for every signed vendor contract,
which stimulates an active search. As we will see later, a critical implication of Proposition 2 is
that labor market power entails a more concentrated market structure.
3.4.3 Buying agents and search complementarity
The value of sending a buying agent for a firm in sector F is:













Equation (33) shows that each firm in sector F pays a unit cost κ for each agent who visits
submarket j that may establish a vendor relationship with probability πFj,t = ψσ
I
j,tq (θj,t), and
brings a capital gain XFj,t+1 − J̃Fj,t+1.
Firms in sector F send buying agents to visit prospective intermediate-goods suppliers at
the optimal submarkets until the value of forming a vendor relationship collapses to zero (recall
that a law of large numbers holds and, thus, conditional on the aggregate states, expected and
































and consequently the submarkets with a higher capital gain, XFj,t+1− J̃Fj,t+1, attract more buying
agents to visit. The inflow of buying agents increases the tightness ratio in each submarket,
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which decreases the matching probability for those buying agents. In equilibrium, the tightness
ratio adjusts to make the gain from entering into all submarkets equal to the cost κ.
Equation (34) implies that, because q(·) is a decreasing function, the tightness ratio θj,t














As in our simple model, directed search is key to generating search complementarities.
3.5 Period equilibrium




that is a fixed point of the product
of the best response function (32) and the optimality condition (35). As before, we ignore
the trivial equilibrium with zero output. The whole dynamic equilibrium of the economy is a
repetition of these period equilibria as linked by the value functions outlined above.
To determine the measure of firms and aggregate output, we assume that new product lines
are created at the constant rate n in each period t. The measure of product lines that remain
unmatched with a final-goods producer in the next period t+ 1 (ñIj,t+1) is equal to those lines




(1− χ) ñIj,t), plus those






(1− χ) ñIj,t + δ̂nj,t + n. (36)
Using the definition of the tightness ratio θj,t, the measure of buying agents sent to submarket
j is ñFj,t = ñ
I
j,tθj,t, and the measure of vendor relationship (nj,t+1) comprises those that survive










The measure of vendor relationships matched with a worker (n̂j,t+1) comprises those that










The measure of vendor relationships that are unmatched with workers is vj,t = nj,t − n̂j,t, and
vacancies are equal to the measure of vendor relationships unmatched with workers vt =
∑
vj,t.




n̂j,t, where the first term on the
RHS shows the unemployment outflow induced by job creation (put ut), and the second term
shows the unemployment inflow from random job and vendor-relationship separation.
Aggregate output is a weighted sum of final goods produced across submarkets Yt =∑J
j=1 n̂j,tyj,t, where n̂j,t is the measure of vendor relationships matched with a worker, determined
by equation (38), and yj,t is the final output of vendor relationships, determined by equations
(27) and (28), respectively. Aggregate output is used for aggregate consumption, Ct, search
costs, and entry costs:












4 Calibration and measurement
We calibrate our model by matching its steady state to post-WWII U.S. data at a quarterly
frequency. A discount factor β of 0.987 (equivalent to 0.95 at a yearly frequency) replicates an
average annual interest rate of 5% over the sample period.
We pick 20 productivity types, J , such that each type of firm I corresponds to a vigintile
of the productivity distribution. Hence, type-1 firms are the bottom 5% of the productivity
distribution and type-20 firms the top 5%. In our model, the measured total factor productivity
(mTFP) of firms I results from the combination of the exogenous productivity, xj, and the






. Thus, we calibrate the dispersion of xj
to match the observations by Syverson (2011) that the average ratio of mTFP between industry
plants at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the productivity distribution using four-digit SIC
industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector is 1.92. We match this ratio by assuming that
log (xj) is uniformly distributed between −0.12 and 0.12. We normalize the level of aggregate
productivity z equal to 1.
With respect to the search cost function, we set ν = 3, implying that the marginal search cost
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is a quadratic function of the search effort. We normalize the cost of signing a vendor contract
to be equal to the average productivity of vendor relationships, i.e., κ = 1 (the parameter ψ, to
be calibrated below, varies to compensate for this normalization).
We calibrate δ̂ = 1/16 to replicate the average duration of 4 years in vendor relationships in
the Compustat Customer Segment data (which report the major customers for a subset of U.S.







, where α = 0.5 imposes symmetry. By setting ψ = 0.54, we get that 88% of
product lines for the medium firms are active in the steady state, matching the observed 12%
average rate of idleness in the U.S. non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors before the
Great Recession (Michaillat and Saez, 2015, and Ghassibe and Zanetti, 2020).
Following Shimer (2005) and Thomas and Zanetti (2009), the flow value of unemployment ξ
(the marginal value of leisure in our model) is set to 40% of the mean labor productivity. The
worker’s bargaining share τ̃ is set to 0.65, such that the labor income share of output is equal to
0.66, consistent with the long-run average of labor share in the U.S. economy. With τ = 0.5, the
remaining 34% of total income is evenly distributed between firms I and F .
We normalize population to one. Following Shimer (2005), we target the quarterly job finding
rate pu = 0.7, an unemployment rate, u = 0.055, and labor market tightness v/u = 1.3. These





the employment-to-unemployment (EU) transition rate is 0.041 (0.041/ (0.041 + 0.7) = 0.055),
and the EU transition probability from vendor-contract dissolutions is (1− pu) δ̂ = 0.019. Thus,
δ, the exogenous job separation rate, is 0.041− 0.019 = 0.022. We set the creation rate of new
product lines, n̂, equal to 0.0017 to be consistent with this calibration.
In our model, the rate of obsolescence of a product line can be interpreted as the rate of
plant exit. Lee and Mukoyama (2015) estimate the average exit rate of manufacturing plants
equal to 5.5% on a yearly basis (1.4% on a quarterly basis) using the Longitudinal Research
Database (LRD) from the U.S. Census Bureau (see Hamano and Zanetti, 2017, for a discussion
on the empirical estimates of plant entry and exit rates). Hence, we set the rate of product line
obsolescence χ = 0.13 and get an average obsolescence rate equal to 1.4%.
Finally, we use the model to measure the probability of labor market forgiveness, δ̃, equal
to 0.51, which matches the output share of the top 10% of firms of 0.64 reported by Autor
et al. (2020). A value δ̃ = 0.51 means that firms forgive workers on average after 2 periods (i.e.,
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after six months). In our numerical analysis below, we will vary δ̃ to assess monopsony power’s
non-linear effect on market concentration. Table 1 summarizes our model’s calibration.
Description Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.987
Number of firm type J 20
Productivity log(xj) U [-0.12,0.12]
Search cost function, curvature ν 3
Cost of sending a buying agent κ 1
Vendor contract expiration rate δ̂ 1/16
Matching elasticity α 0.5
Matching efficiency ψ 0.54
Flow value of unemployment ξ 0.4
Worker’s bargaining share τ̃ 0.65
Final goods firm’s bargaining share τ 0.5
Exogenous job separation rate δ 0.022
Inflow of product line n̂ 0.0017
Rate of product line obsolescence χ 0.14
Probability of labor market forgiveness δ̃ 0.51
Table 1: Calibration
5 Quantitative results
In this section, we report nine quantitative findings from our extended model. First, search effort
increases with productivity. Second, search complementarities induce market concentration.
Third, monopsony power in the labor market reinforces market concentration. Four, monopsony
power lowers wages and the labor income share, but it also moves workers toward high-wage jobs
and increases wage inequality. Five, in the absence of strategic complementarities, monopsony
power in the labor market has a limited effect on market concentration. Six, lower search costs
increase market concentration. Seven, search complementarities amplify the effect of negative
aggregate productivity shocks and make them more persistent. Eight, negative aggregate
productivity shocks increase market concentration because they disproportionally affect the
output of low-productivity firms. Nine, lower search costs reduce the volatility of the economy.
These findings mirror our simple model’s main takeaways in Section 2. Let us review each of
them in more detail.
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5.1 Search effort increases with productivity
Figure 13 plots, for each productivity level (j), the search efforts ({σIj }Jj=1, top panel) of firms
I, the measure of buying agents sent by firm F to each island ({ñFj }Jj=1, middle panel), and
the probability that product lines form vendor relationships ({πIj }Jj=1, bottom panel). Higher-
productivity intermediate-goods producers search more intensively, attract more buying agents,
and enjoy a higher matching probability.
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Figure 13: Search effort
5.2 Search complementarities induce market concentration
We turn now to market concentration. Equations (36) and (37) give us the measures of production






























which is strictly increasing in the probability of forming vendor relationships πIj , and strictly
decreasing in the rate of product line obsolescence χ.
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Figure 14: Firm size and vacancies
The upper panel of Figure 14 plots the distribution of the measure of product lines matched
with a worker. This measure is increasing in the firm’s productivity and highly concentrated
among the “superstar firms”: the top 5% own 48% of product lines and the next 5% own an
additional 14.5%. The high concentration of firm size appears despite a moderate productivity
dispersion in our calibration. The top 5% of firms own around three times more product lines as
the next 5% of firms, although the former ones are only 1.3% more productive than the latter.
The reason is that equations (39)-(40) imply that the measure of product lines is non-linear in
πIj . The non-linearity becomes stronger when the measure gets close to one, which is the case
for the most productive firms.
A popular measure of firms’ size is labor market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for employment, HHIemp =
∑20
j=1 n̂j. Berger et al. (2019) document
that the unweighted average HHI for employment across labor markets in the U.S. is about
0.42, while the average HHI becomes 0.12 once it is weighted by the labor market’s share of
total employment. The HHI implied by our model is 0.27, exactly at the mean between the
unweighted and weighted HHI measured by Berger et al. (2019). This result is a strong validation
of our theory, since we did not target this observation.
With respect to the distribution of vacancies (bottom panel of Figure 14), since all firms I
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have the same vacancy-filling rates, vacancies are a measure of labor demand. The number of

















pn + δ + δ̂
) .
is strictly increasing in πIj , but strictly decreasing in χ, for a given probability of matching with
a worker, pn. Intuitively, a higher πIj or a lower χ decreases the rate of product line obsolescence
and, hence, raises the measure of product lines (nj + ñ
I
j ). As a firm gains more product lines, it
also has a greater need to expand hiring (vj). For instance, the top 5% of firms post 47% of all
vacancies and the next 5%, 14.3%.
With respect to the distribution of output, a type-j firm produces:
yj = zxj︸︷︷︸
Output per active product line
· nj
nj + ñIj︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. line util. rate
· nj + ñIj︸ ︷︷ ︸





Equation (41) embodies the four channels that generate market concentration in our model.
First, high-productivity firms produce more per active product line (zxj). Given the small
calibrated productivity dispersion in our model, this channel explains a minor fraction of industry
concentration. The difference in exogenous idiosyncratic productivity between the top 5% of
“superstar firms” and the bottom 5% of “lightweight firms” is 24%. Yet, our model generates a
ratio between the outputs of the top and bottom firms of 372. Second, high-productivity firms
have a higher product line utilization rate (nj/(nj + ñ
I
j )) because they search more actively for
partners, and due to search complementarities, potential partners send more buying agents to
them. While the bottom 5% of firms have 54% of their product lines active, the top 5% operates
95% of their product lines. Third, since the product lines (nj + ñ
I
j) of high-productivity firms
are active more frequently, fewer of them become obsolete. Fourth, firms have monopsony power,
which increases their profit share of vendor matches and provides incentives to expand their
output. The next subsection will elaborate on this channel, which affects ñIj , and n
I
j non-linearly
in the firm’s size.
The quantitative effect of equation (41) is that the most productive firms account for a
disproportionate share of output: the top 5% produce 49% of output and the next 5% produce
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an additional 15%, while the bottom 5% only generate 0.13% of output. These numbers are in
line with the observations documented by Autor et al. (2020).
We can compare this result with a simple span-of-control model à la Lucas. With a production
function xlγ where x is managerial talent and l is hours worked, the output ratio in such a model
between two firms with x = e−0.12 and x = e0.12 (the same dispersion in managerial abilities as
the dispersion in productivities in our model) is e0.24
1
1−γ . To replicate an output ratio of 372
between the top and bottom firms, we would need γ = 0.96, which is much higher than other
estimates of returns to scale. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) argue that, in a span-of-control model,
we should calibrate γ = 0.85, while Guner et al. (2018) estimate γ = 0.77. An alternative way
to think about this is that a span-of-control model with γ = 0.96 would generate differences in
mTFP much larger than the ratio of 1.92 documented by Syverson (2011).
Our results also challenge the classic prediction that firms with market power operate under
excess capacity in equilibrium (an idea that goes back to Wicksell, 1934). Our model delivers
the opposite result: top firms operate at a higher utilization rate, eliminating a key source of
inefficiency in the economy—the more concentrated the market, the greater the rate of utilization
of product lines.
5.3 Monopsony power: Market structure and wages
We mentioned before that monopsony power affects ñIj and n
I
j non-linearly. To see this, Figure
15 shows the market structure for three alternative degrees of threatening power δ̃: 0.51 (our
benchmark calibration), 0.75, and 1.
In the top panel of Figure 15, the top 10% of firms produce 64.1% of output, our calibration
target. The middle panel of Figure 15 documents that, as we increase δ̃ to 0.75 (equivalent to
an average rate of forgiveness of 1.3 periods), the share of output of the top 10% of firms falls to
56.9%. When we completely eliminate monopsony power (i.e., δ̃ = 1), the share of output of the
top 10% of firms becomes 53.1%. Figure 15 also illustrates Proposition 2: firms with a larger
market share search more intensely, but this intensity decreases with δ̃.
Figure 15 justifies why we can think about our model as a measurement device: the model
tells how much monopsony power we need to account for market concentration that is consistent
with mTFP, rate of idleness, and labor market observations. Our model measures a moderate
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Figure 15: Market structure
amount of monopsony power (a punishment that lasts only six months on average), but such a
market power can increase concentration at the top 10% of firms from 53.1% to 64.1% of output.
We move now to wages. In our model, monopsony power affects the wage distribution via two
channels. In the first channel, the equilibrium wage decreases with the threatening power. We
can see this effect in Figure 16, which plots the distribution of wages for j-type firms with high
labor market power (dark-green histograms), medium labor market power (green histograms),
and no labor market power cases (light-green histograms). As stated in Proposition 1, wages are
increasing in the productivity of the firm, but decreasing with monopsony power. Moreover, the
wage differential within the j-type firm is non-linear: the more productive the firm, the stronger
the threatening power and, therefore, the larger the share of the surplus kept by the firm.
Our result agrees with a large empirical literature on the negative effect of market concentra-
tion on wage compensation. For example, see Dube et al. (2016), Benmelech et al. (2018), Qiu
and Sojourner (2019), and Naidu et al. (2018). Also, Berger et al. (2019) find that markdowns,
the ratio between the marginal revenue product of labor and its wage, are increasing in firm size.
Jarosch et al. (2019) show that employer market power is also boosted by search and matching
frictions. Finally, in Peters (2020), firms’ market power is endogenous and the distribution of
markups emerges as an equilibrium outcome.
The second channel through which monopsony power affects the wage distribution is that it
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Figure 16: Wage with different labor market power
reallocates workers toward high-productivity firms that have lower firm labor income shares.
This last point is a standard feature of search and matching models. Intuitively, when a firm’s
productivity is sufficiently low, the firm still needs to compensate the workers that have the
outside value of finding another job and receives zero profit. In this case, the labor income share
is close to one. As we increase the firm’s productivity, the outside value becomes less binding and
the labor income share decreases. In addition, by reallocating workers toward high-productivity
firms, monopsony power increases wage inequality.
These results agree with the evidence. De Loecker et al. (2020) find that the decline in the
economy-wide labor share is mainly driven by large, high-markup firms that have individually
low labor shares. Similar findings appear in Autor et al. (2020) and Kehrig and Vincent (2017).
But labor income share also falls when δ̃ decreases. In our benchmark calibration (δ̃ = 0.51),
the labor income share is 0.66 and it increases to 0.663 when δ̃ = 0.75 and 0.667 when δ̃ = 1.
While this effect is modest, we could substantially increase it if we were to assume (as is likely
to be the case in the real world) that high-productivity firms also have a higher δ̃ (for example,
through better HR processes to “punish” workers that do not accept low wage offers).
Finally, we can compare the wage markdown implied by our model with the empirical
evidence. Given the linear production function, the wage markdown is equal to xj/wj. The
average wage markdown weighted by the employment share in our calibration is 1.52. The
difference in the wage markdowns across firms is sizeable (Figure 19 in Appendix A.3 plots the
distribution of wage markdown across firms). For example, the type-20 firm generates a wage
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markdown of 1.55, 16.5% larger than the wage markdown charged by the type-1 firm, whose
wage markdown is 1.33. Hershbein et al. (2019) document that the average U.S. establishment
sets a wage markdown of 1.53, and the establishments in the top decile of the distribution charge
roughly a 20% higher wage markdown than the establishments in the bottom decile. Hence,
our model roughly agrees with the data regarding the average level and the dispersion of the
wage markdown, even though we did not use any information regarding these observations in
our calibration.
5.4 Monopsony power without search complementarities
We just saw how monopsony power in the labor market amplifies the effect of search comple-
mentarities on market concentration. Does monopsony power generate market concentration in
the absence of search complementarities? Yes, but the effect is mild.
To see this, we compute the market structure without search complementarities. To make
our analysis comparable to our benchmark results, we fix all tightness ratios θj,t at their values in
the benchmark model, but let the search effort (σIj ) vary. Thus, when δ̃ = 0.51, the distribution
of output shares across would be the same with or without search complementarities.
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Figure 17: Market structure with no search complementarity
Figure 17 shows the output shares for the same three levels of monopsony power as in Figure
15: 0.51 (our benchmark calibration), 0.75, and 1. By construction, the top panel of Figure 17
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is identical to the top panel of Figure 15. The middle and lower panels of Figure 17 show that
the role of monopsony power in market concentration becomes milder as the incentives to scale
up production become smaller. For example, the top 5% of firms decrease their output share
from 49.5% to 46.2% when δ̃ increases from 0.51 to 0.75.
5.5 Lower search costs increase market concentration
We study the dependence of market structure on the cost of signing a vendor contract by
considering a permanent decline in the unit cost of visiting each submarket, κ, from 1 to 0.98.
A lower unit search cost induces all firms to search more actively, attracting a larger number
of buying agents from sector F to visit them, increasing the probability of forming a vendor
relationship and raising the number of product lines at the new steady state. However, the top
5% of “superstar firms” benefit the most from the reduction in κ, growing from producing 49.3%
of output to producing 65.6% (see Figure 20 in Appendix A.3).
As in the case of the basic model, we interpret these results as suggesting that improvements
in IT over the last few decades (or, more generally, in the ability to scale up production) have
been a critical factor behind the recent increase in market concentration documented by Autor
et al. (2020) and others.
5.6 Response of output to aggregate shocks
Our last exercise explores how the model responds to an aggregate shock by assuming that the
level of aggregate productivity is stochastic. The production technology in equation (28) becomes
yj,t = ztxj , where zt follows log (zt) = ρzlog (zt−1) + σzεt, and εt ∼ N (0, 1). We calibrate ρz and
σz to 0.95 and 0.011, respectively, which are standard values in the literature. We also modify
the conditional expectations in all the relevant value functions of the agents of the model.
We implement a negative aggregate productivity shock, which reduces all firms’ log-productivity.
To ease the computational burden of keeping track of 20 different types of firms, we simplify
our problem by assuming, for this subsection only, that the utility function of the household is
linear in consumption.
Figure 18 shows the IRFs of the output of type-1 firms (the bottom 5%; continuous blue
line), the type-10 firms (the median firms; discontinuous black line), and the type-20 firms
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(the top 5%; firms; discontinuous red line) to an aggregate shock that reduces log aggregate
productivity by 10%. Aggregate productivity reverts back to the steady state with a persistence
of 0.95. We express the IRFs in percentage deviations with respect to the deterministic steady
state. At impact, all firms’ output drops by 9.52%. The recovery after this drop is slow because
the productivity shock reduces firms’ incentive to search. Thus, more product lines remain idle
and they become obsolete at a higher rate. The process of reducing product lines is protracted
and induces a lot of endogenous persistence in output.












Figure 18: Response of output to 10% TFP shock
Interestingly, the recovery process is uneven across firms and increases market concentration.
Specifically, it takes longer for low-productivity firms to recover. Intuitively, low-productivity
firms’ profit share is lower due to the worker’s outside option of finding higher-paying jobs.
Consequently, the low-productivity firms’ search effort is more sensitive to productivity shocks,
and these low-productivity firms lose more product lines in relative terms. In fact, for a few
periods after the shock, the higher obsolescence rate of the non-active product lines of these
low-productivity firms is such a powerful mechanism that their output continues dropping even
if aggregate productivity is reverting to its mean. This mechanism accounts for the U-shaped
IRF of low-productivity firms. In comparison, high-productivity firms recover faster, and market
concentration increases.
Our findings agree, in sign and size, with Şahin et al. (2011), who documented that between
December 2007 and December 2009, jobs declined 10.4% in small firms (those with fewer than
fifty employees), compared with 7.5% in large ones.
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Figure 18 also links our model with the Great Moderation of the U.S. economy after 1984.
Since larger firms react less to negative aggregate shocks, the fall in search costs that we have
argued above has occurred during the last decades helps us understand the growth in the size of
superstar firms and the lower aggregate volatility of the economy.
6 Conclusion
Search complementarities have enormous consequences for market structure and the firm’s size
distribution. Through a “Matthew effect,” small differences in productivity are transformed
into large differences in firms’ size, vacancies, and output. The key to this “Matthew effect” lies
with the endogenous search decisions of intermediate- and final-goods producers under directed
search: higher productivity leads to higher search effort by the intermediate-goods producers
and more buying agents by the final-goods producers. The presence of monopsony power in the
labor market reinforces the process even more. The forces combine to generate superstar firms
with output shares that match empirical observations.
Our model also suggests that a reduction in search costs (which can be more generally
understood as a fall in the cost of scaling a business up) leads to i) higher market concentration;
ii) lower labor income shares; and iii) more monopsony power by firms. We interpret the IT
revolution since the 1980s in the U.S. and other advanced economies as a reduction in search
costs (better logistics software, improved inventory control, easier database management, etc.).
Thus, our model offers a simple and parsimonious explanation of several important aspects of
the data.
There is much scope for further investigation. We want to look at microdata to cross-validate
the forces we highlight in our theoretical and quantitative analysis. We want to incorporate
a firm’s life-cycle. We want to think about innovation and technological adoption within the
context of strategic complementarities. We want to think more about heterogeneity among
different industry sectors. Are search costs as relevant in heavy manufacturing as in consumer
services? Do the differences among industries in terms of market structure and the firm’s size
distribution align with our model? Finally, we also want to think about the policy implications
of our model. We hope to explore some of these avenues of research shortly.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the steady state, ceteris paribus, the wage decreases with the firm’s vacancy share (sj) and
increases with the probability of forgiveness (δ̃)
Proof. We begin our proof by showing that the ex-ante value of employment Wj decreases with
the firm’s vacancy share, sj, and it increases with the probability of forgiveness, δ̃. We denote
the total surplus in a labor market without labor market power as:
LTS∗j = Wj − U + Jj −Xj,
so that the following equality holds:
LTSj = LTS
∗
j + U − Ũj.
Equation (25) implies that:
Wj = Ũj + (1− τ̃)LTSj,
or, equivalently,





Equation (17) entails that:















upn (Wj − U)




Notice that ∂Γ/∂sj > 0 and ∂Γ/∂δ̃ < 0.
Substituting equation (43) into equation (42), it yields the following value for employment:






which implies that Wj decreases with sj, and it increases with δ̃. Since changes in sj or δ̃
determine the split of the total surplus between firms and workers, they involve a variation in
Γ(sj, δ̃), and do not have a first-order effect on the value of U and LTS
∗
j .
Next, we show that the current period wage, wj, decreases with sj and increases with δ̃.
Equation (18) implies that:
Wj = wj + β [(1− δ − (1− πj)χ)Wj + (δ + (1− πj)χ)U ] ,
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or:
wj = (1− β)Wj + β (δ + (1− πj)χ) (Wj − U) , (46)
which shows that wj strictly increases with Wj. Therefore, we have that wj decreases with sj
and increases with δ̃.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In the steady state, ceteris paribus, firm I’s search effort increases with the firm’s vacancy share
sj, and it decreases with the probability of forgiveness δ̃.
Proof. We begin our proof by showing that the value of a firm matched to a worker (Jj) increases
with sj and decreases with δ̃.
Equation (20) implies:
Xj = αXJJj, (47)
where αXJ =
βpn
1−β(1−pn−χ) < 1. We rewrite equation (26) as:






LTS∗j + U − Ũj
)
. (48)












) · LTS∗j , (49)
where Γ(sj, δ̃) is defined by equation (44). Equation (49) implies that Jj increases with Γ(·).
Since ∂Γ/∂sj > 0 and ∂Γ/∂δ̃ < 0, Jj increases with sj, and decreases with δ̃. Consequently,
equation (47) implies that Xj increases with sj and decreases with δ̃. From equations (22) and
(23), it is straightforward to show that XIj = Xj/2 + J̃
I
j /2, which implies that X
I
j increases with
Xj, and it thus increases with sj and decreases with δ̃.
Next, we show that ∆J Ij = X
I
j − (1− χ) J̃ Ij increases with XIj , and, thus, it increases with




j > 0 in two steps.
In the first step, we show that J̃ Ij increases with X
I
j . Specifically, by denoting the optimal
search effort with σ∗, and expressing J̃ Ij and σ
∗ as functions of Xj, we re-write equation (29) in
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1− πIj (σ∗ (Xj))
) . (54)










clearly implying that J̃ Ij increases with X
I
j .
In the second step, we show that ∆J Ij increases with X
I




j − c (σj)






















, and we treat σj and ∆J
I
j as






















The optimality condition for firm I’s problem (equation (29)) implies that:
βπ
′
∆J Ij − c
′
(σj) = 0, (57)




which shows that ∆J Ij increases with X
I
j , and consequently it increases with sj and decreases
with δ̃. By using these findings in equation (32), we have that firm I’s search effort increases
with the firm’s labor market share sj and decreases with the probability of forgiveness δ̃.
55
A.3 Additional Figures
Figure 19 plots the distribution of the wage markdown in the deterministic steady state. We
can see how the markdown is increasing with the firm’s productivity.


















Figure 19: Distribution of the wage markdown
Figure 20 plots the distribution of output share for two different values of κ. The bottom
panel shows our benchmark case of κ = 1, while the top panel shows the firms’ output when
κ = 0.98.














Figure 20: Output shares with different κ
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